Hacker’s Elusive Thoughts The Web
This book is 100% complete
Completed on 2016-05-21
About the Book
This book is going to help Web Application developers, Professional Penetration Testers and Web Application Security Analysts to standardise their Web Application security assessments. It is also going to help them build a comprehensive penetration testing framework, that can easily be integrated to their custom Secure Life Cycle (SDLC) development.
About the Author
Table of Contents
1 Formalizing Web Penetration Test
1.16 Chaining Scanners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.17 Using Wrappers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.18 Why Python . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.19 Useful Python Libraries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.20 Python Useful Open Source Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.21 The Python Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.22 Python Development Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.23 Python Libraries Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.24 Installing Python . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.25 Installing Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.26 Installing Beautiful Soup 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.27 Python Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.28 Program Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.29 Documenting Python code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.30 Writing Your Own Scanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.31 Problematic Scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.32 The Scanner Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.33 Python Useful Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.34 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.35 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2 Scanning With Class
2.1 Manual Versus Automated Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.2 Why Commercial Scanners Fail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.3 Integrating Our Scanner To SDLC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55
2.4 Problems When Writing A Scanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Scanning Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.6 Scanning Time Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.7 Defining URL(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.8 Choosing HTML Parser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.9 Defining HTML Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.10 Parsing URLs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.11 Parsing HTML pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.12 Restricting Scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.13 Connection Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.14 HTTP Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
2.15 Fetching Pages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.16 Avoiding Denial Of Service Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.17 Performing Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
2.18 Assessing Replies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.19 Sending Malicious Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.20 Analysing Fuzz Data with Python . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.21 Passive Scanning Analysing Headers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.22 Debugging Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
2.23 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.24 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
3 The Payload Management
3.1 Keeping Up To Date Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.2 Payloads And Fuzzing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.3 Intelligent Fuzzing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
3.4 Input Validation Obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
3.5 The Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles Project . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.6 Encoding And Payloads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
3.7 Character Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
3.8 Code Point Explained . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
3.9 Encoding And Internet Browsers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3.10 Encoding And Rendering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.11 Payload Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
3.12 Browser Sandboxing Bypass . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3.13 Payload Size Calculation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.14 Building Universal Exploits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
3.15 Base64 Encoding And Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.16 UTF-7 Encoding And Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . 134
3.17 Double URL Encoding And Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . 135
3.18 Encoding And Path-Traversal Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.19 UTF-8 encoding And Path-traversal Attacks . . . . . . . . . . 137
3.20 UTF-16 encoding And Path Traversal Attacks . . . . . . . . . 139
3.21 NULL Character And Path Traversal Attacks . . . . . . . . . 140
3.22 Using Mangled Paths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.23 Octal encoding and XSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.24 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
4 Infiltrating Corporate Networks Using XML Injections
4.1 Why XXE Attacks Still Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
4.2 How Extensible Markup Language Is Used . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.3 About Document Type Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.4 More On External Entities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.5 A URI As Reference In Markup Languages . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.6 Where XML Parsers Are Used . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.7 XML Parser Inner Workings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.8 XML Parser And XXE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.9 Generating XML Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
4.10 Error Based XXE Injections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.11 The XML Web Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.12 Generating XXE Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.13 Exploiting XXE Injections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.14 XXE Injections And HTML Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.15 XXE Injections And CDATA Tags . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.16 XXE Injections And Cross Site Scripting . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.17 XXE Injections And Open Redirections . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.18 XXE Injections And Clickjacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.19 XXE Injections And HTML Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
4.20 XXE Injections And Internal Resource Extraction . . . . . . . 169
4.21 XXE Injections And Denial of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.22 XXE Injections And Port Scanning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.23 XXE Injections And Post Exploitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.24 XXE Injections And Service Fingerprint . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
4.25 XXE Injections And Host Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.26 XXE Injections And Web Server Fingerprinting . . . . . . . . 183
4.27 The XXE Identification Scanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.28 The XXE Port Scanner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
4.29 The XXE Directory Enumerator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187
4.30 Mitigating XXE Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
4.31 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.32 Exercises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
5 Phishing Like A Boss
5.1 Why Phishing Attacks Still Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
5.2 Phishing Attacks Evolve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
5.3 Clickjacking Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
5.4 Exploiting Clickjacking Attacks Using Cascading Style Sheets 196
5.5 CSRF Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.6 Exploiting CSRF Using GET Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
5.7 Exploiting CSRF Using POST To GET Interchanges . . . . . 204
5.8 Exploiting CSRF Using POST Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
5.9 Exploiting CSRF And Enctype . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
5.10 Exploiting CSRF Using XMLHttpRequest . . . . . . . . . . . 208
5.11 XSS Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.12 XSS Attacks And Clickjacking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
5.13 XSS Attacks, Clickjacking And Payload Obfuscation . . . . . 216
5.14 Clickjacking And CSRF . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.15 Countermeasures Against Phishing Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . 221
5.16 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6 Obfuscating SQL Fuzzing For Fun and Profit
6.1 Why SQL Injection Attacks Still Exist . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
6.2 SQL injection Attacks Evolve . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
6.3 SQL Obfuscation Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
6.4 Using Case Variation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
6.5 Using SQL Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
6.6 Using Single URL Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
6.7 Using Double URL Encoding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
6.8 Using Dynamic Query Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
6.9 Using Conversion Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.10 Multil Layer SQL Obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
6.11 SQL Injection Filter Design Mentality . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
6.12 Whitelist Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
6.13 Whitelist Filters In .NET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
6.14 Whitelist Filters In Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
6.15 Blacklist Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
6.16 Blacklist Filters In ASP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
6.17 Blacklist Filters In Java . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.18 Hybrid Filters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
6.19 Thinks To Consider When Automating Fuzzing . . . . . . . . 259
6.20 Stored Procedures And Parameterized Queries . . . . . . . . . 261
6.21 Web Application Firewall Bypassing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
6.22 Python Library Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
6.23 Automating SQL Fuzzing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
6.24 Hiding SQL Injection Attacks From Logs . . . . . . . . . . 269
6.25 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
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