Chapter 7
The persons towards whom men feel benevolent, 1 and for what reasons, and in what frame of mind, will be clear when we have defined what favor is. Let it then be taken to be the feeling in accordance with which one who has it is said to rend er a service to one who needs it, not in return for something nor in the interest of him who renders it, but in that of the recipient. And the favor will be great if the recipient is in pressing need, or if the service or the times and circumstances are important or difficult, or if the benefactor is the only one, or the first who has rendered it, or has done so in the highest degree. By needs I mean longings, especially for things the failure to obtain which is accompanied by pain; such are the desires, for instance, love; also those which arise in bodily sufferings and dangers, for when a man is in pain or danger he desires something. That is why those who help a man who is poor or an exile, even if the service be ever so small, are regarded with favor owing to the urgency and occasion of the need; for instance, the man who gave the mat 2 to another in the Lyceum. It is necessary then, if possible, that the service should be in the same direction 3 ; if not, that it should apply to cases of similar or greater need.
Since then it is evident on what occasions, Since then it is evident on what occasions, 4 for what reasons, and in what frame of mind a feeling of benevolence arises, it is clear that we must derive our arguments from this—to show that the one side either has been, or still is, in such pain or need, and that the other has rendered, or is rendering, such a service in such a time of need. It is evident also by what means it is possible to make out that there is no favor at all, or that those who render it are not actuated by benevolence 5 ; for it can either be said that they do, or have done so, for their own sake, in which case there is no favor; or that it was mere chance; or that they acted under compulsion; or that they were making a return, not a gift, whether they knew it or not; for in both cases it is an equivalent return, so that in this case also there is no favor. And the action must be considered in reference to all the categories; for if there is a favor it is so because of substance, quantity, quality, time, or place. 6 And it denotes lack of goodwill, if persons have not rendered a smaller service, 7 or if they have rendered similar, equal, or greater services to our enemies; for it is evident that they do not act for our sake in this case either. Or if the service was insignificant, and rendered by one who knew it; for no one admits that he has need of what is insignificant.
The one, the smaller number, and the greater number must be of the same species. Thus, 5 pounds is a greater good than 2 pounds; but 5 farthings is not a greater good than 2 pounds, since the smaller number is not reckoned in with the greater Buckley .↩︎
If B (life) follows on, is the consequent of A (health), but A is not the consequent of B, then A is a greater good than B.↩︎
.Eight is greater than 2 by 6, which itself is greater than 2.↩︎
A thing may be of greater importance in two ways: (a) that which is a first principle is superior to that which is not; (b) that which is not a first principle, but an end, is superior to that which is a first principle; for the end is superior to the means. In the illustration that follows: (a) the first principle (suggesting the plot) is said to be of more importance (worse) than the end or result (carrying out the plot); (b) on the other hand, this end is said to be worse than the first principle, since the end is superior to the means. Thus the question of the amount of guilt can be argued both ways.↩︎
Oropus, a frontier-town of Boeotia and Attica , had been occupied by the Thebans ( 366 B.C.). Callistratus suggested an arrangement which was agreed to and carried out by Chabrias—that the town should remain in Theban possession for the time being. Negotiations proved unsuccessful and the Thebans refused to leave, whereupon Chabrias and Callistratus were brought to trial. Leodamas was an Athenian orator, pupil of Isocrates, and pro-Theban in his political views.↩︎
Pind. O. 1.1 .↩︎
e.g. it is worse to be blind than deaf; therefore sight is better than hearing (Schrader).↩︎