1Defined by Herbert Schlossberg as an approach to law by which “the validity of the law is dependent entirely on the fact of enactment; it does not have any force prior to that, nor may its validity be questioned after it is enacted by the constituted powers” (Idols For Destruction, (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1983), p. 206). Schlossberg points out how the atrocities that were performed under Hitler in Germany were perfectly just and legal in terms of a positivist philosophy of law (p. 207). Legal positivism is a perfect vehicle for statist tyranny.

The modern rise of Legal Positivism in the USA is due largely to the tremendous influence of the former chief justice of the Supreme Court, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. He scorned the notion of either logic or a higher law being basic to law. He affirmed,

The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do with the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be governed …The substance of the law at any given time pretty nearly corresponds, so far as it goes, with what is then understood to be convenient; but its form and machinery, and the degree to which it is able to work out desired results, depend very much upon its past. (The Common Law 1881, as quoted by Rousas J. Rushdoony, Law and Liberty, (Fairfax: Thoburn Press, 1971), p. 22)

↩

2Ibid., p. 207.↩

3Greg L. Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Nutley: Craig Press, 1979). By This Standard (Tyler: Institute for Christian Economics, 1985).↩

4Rousas John Rushdoony has written many books dealing with Biblical law but the ones that I have found the most helpful in the area of interaction with Natural Law are The Institutes of Biblical Law ([n.c.]: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1973). Christianity and the State (Vallecito: Ross House Books, 1986). Law and Liberty (Fairfax: Thoburn Press, 1977).↩

5Herbert Schlossberg, Idols for Destruction (Nashville: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 1983) especially chapters three and five.↩

6For convenience I will capitalize Natural Law when referring to philosophical systems of thought that go by that name (unless those I quote fail to do so), and I will leave Natural Law uncapitalized when referring to the Biblical doctrine which I will seek in sections II and III to distinguish from Natural Law.↩

7See e.g., J. Van Englen, “Natural Law,” in Dictionary of Theology, p. 752 and Paul B. Henry, “Natural Law,” Dictionary of Ethics, p. 449.↩

8See the discussion in Gary DeMar, “Building a Christian Civilization,” The Biblical Worldview Volume 2/5 (July, 1986).↩

9Rabbi Solomon Freehof, “The Natural Law in the Jewish Tradition,” in Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1951, vol. V (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), pp. 15-28.↩

10Khalifa Abdul Hakim, “The Natural Law in the Moslem Tradition,” in Ibid., pp. 29-68.↩

11M. S. Sundaram, “The Natural Law in the Hindu Tradition,” in Ibid., pp. 69-90.↩

12Daisetz T. Suzuki, “The Natural Law in the Buddhist Tradition,” in Ibid., pp. 91-119.↩

13Hu Shih, “The Natural Law in the Chinese Tradition,” in Ibid., pp. 119-156.↩

14A respected professor at a Reformed seminary favored this idea in a discussion with me and believed that the Puritans adopted this notion. For a different interpretation of the Puritans see discussion below.↩

15See for example Norman L. Geisler, “Natural Law vs. Theonomy,” Moody Monthly (Nov. 1985). Allen Verhey, “Natural Law in Aquinas and Calvin,” in Clifton Orlebeke and Lewis Smedes (eds.) God and the Good (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975). Arthur Holmes, “Human Variables and Natural Law,” Orlebeke and Smedes, Ibid. Alan F. Johnson, “Is There A Biblical Warrant For Natural-Law Theories?” JETS 25/2 (June, 1982):185-199.↩

16Reverend John J. Cavanaugh, “Introduction,” Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1949 vol. III, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1950), p. 2.↩

17Edward F. Barrett, “Editor’s Preface,” Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1951 vol. V, (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1953), p. 3.↩

18“Natural Law,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v.↩

19Paul B. Henry, “Natural Law,” p. 448.↩

20Maurice LeBel, “Natural Law in the Greek Period,” Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1948, vol. II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1950), p. 18-19.↩

21Henry, “Natural Law,” p. 449.↩

22Frame, Doctrine of the Christian Life, pp. 19, 196.↩

23LeBel, “Natural Law in the Greek Period,” p. 25.↩

24Henry, “Natural Law,” p. 449. See also, “Natural Law,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, pp. 451-452.↩

25He said, “If the written law tells against our case, clearly we must appeal to the universal law and insist on its greater equity and justice” (Rhetoric I, 1375a as quoted in LeBel, “Natural Law in the Greek Period,” p. 24).↩

26Aristotle, Rhetoric I, 1374a as quoted in LeBel, “Natural Law in the Greek Period,” p. 24.↩

27John M. Frame, Ethical Problems: Toward a Christian Politics, tape 49. Plato favored no private property, eugenics, compulsory education and censorship of art and literature. For Aristotle, the “State is more important than the individual, since the whole is more important than any part. It is the partnership that includes all partnerships” (Frame, Doctrine of the Christian Life, p. 197).↩

28Albert C. Knudson, The Principles of Christian Ethics (New York/Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, [n.d.], p. 69.↩

29Henry, “Natural Law,” 449.↩

30Cicero, On the Commonwealth, III:22 as quoted in Henry, “Natural Law,” p. 449.↩

31See Ernst Levy, “Natural Law in the Roman Period,” Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1948, vol. II (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1950), pp. 46ff.↩

32Levy, “Natural Law in the Roman Period,” p. 46.↩

33Henry, “Natural Law,” p. 449.↩

34Engen, “Natural Law,” Dictionary of Theology, (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), p. 751.↩

35Decretum pt. 1, distinction 1 as quoted in Rousas J. Rushdoony, “Natural Law and Canon Law,” Position Paper no. 55, Chalcedon.↩

36Though it is by no means clear that all held to a view that made Natural Law something different than what was revealed in Scripture. For instance Rushdoony quotes Rufinus (1170 A.D.) as saying, “Natural Law, which, [was] all but lost in the first man, has been restored in the Mosaic law, perfected in the Gospel, and adorned in custom.” Rousas J. Rushdoony, Christianity and the State, (Vallecito: Ross House Books, 1986), p. 102. This sounds more like Augustine and Calvin than Aquinas!↩

37Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, part one of the second part (New York: Benzinger Brothers).↩

38Frame, Doctrine of the Christian Life, p. 197.↩

39Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q 44, A 1.↩

40Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q 91, A 2.↩

41Engen, “Natural Law,” p. 751. See also Aquinas’ statement, “The light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the foundation of the Natural Law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the divine light. It is therefore evident that the Natural Law is nothing else than the rational creature’s participation of the eternal law.” Q. 91.2.↩

42Knudson, Ethics, p. 71.↩

43Engen, “Natural Law,” p. 751.↩

44Franciscus Suares, De Legibus ac Deo Legislatore, 1619, bk. II, cap. vi as quoted by Robbins, “Some Problems With Natural Law,” p. 16.↩

45Paul Helm, “Calvin and Natural Law,” Scottish Bulletin of Evangelical Theology, 2 (1984):7.↩

46Institutes, Book III.xxiii.2.↩

47M. E. Cheneviere, La Pensee politique de Calvin (Paris, 1937), p. 46 as quoted in J. T. McNeill, “Natural Law in the Teaching of the Reformers,” The Journal of Religion, 26 (1946):180. See also A. D. Verhey, “Natural Law in Aquinas and Calvin,” in God and the Good (c. J. Orlebeke and L. B. Smedes, eds.: Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975).↩

48The main purpose of comparing with the Greeks in his commentary on Romans 2:14 is to give a concrete example of the truth of Paul’s statement that pagans know what is good and so are without excuse.↩

49See many of the quotations on Natural Law from the various Reformers in Peter Alan Lillback, “Ursinus’ Development of the Covenant of Creation: A debt to Melanchton or Calvin?” WTJ, XLIII/2 (Spring, 1981):247-288.↩

50Lillback, “Ursinus’ Development of the Covenant of Creation,” p. 254. Calvin usually referred to Natural Law principles among the pagans to argue in an ad hominum way to show that none are free of guilt. Even if Scripture is rejected or unavailable, men still have the work of the law written on their consciences which renders them without excuse.↩

51

When I say that the laws of nature have been impressed on our minds by God, I mean that the knowledge of these laws consists of certain so-called ‘concreated attitudes.’ This knowledge is not the product of our own mental powers, but it has been implanted in us by God. I am not concerned to make this agree with the philosophy of Aristotle. (Loci (ed. W. Pauck), p. 50 as quoted in Lillback, “Ursinus’ Development of the Covenant of Creation,” p. 264)

Even Bucer, who sometimes appears to have a Natural Law view, brings Mosaic civil laws in through the back door of Natural Law. See Wilhelm Pauck, editor, The Library of Christian Classics, vol. XIX, Melanchthon and Bucer (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 378. His writing is somewhat confusing and draws too many parallels with the Greek writers (pp. 344ff.), but is still closer to equating Scriptural law with Natural Law than it is to the classical formulations.↩

52“For in general the judgment of human comprehension is fallacious because of our innate blindness, so that even if certain patterns of morals have been engraved on our minds, they can scarcely be apprehended.” Corpus Reformatorum, as quoted in John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism (Leidon: E. J. Brill, 1982), p. 16↩

53Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism, p. 30.↩

54Ibid., p. 30 footnote 65.↩

55See for example the nebulous formulation of Melanchthon’s natural laws in Wilhelm Pauck, editor, The Library of Christian Classics, vol. XIX, Melanchton and Bucer (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 50ff.↩

56See the discussion in Rushdoony, Institutes, vol. I, pp. 679ff. Two of his four most basic summaries of law for instance are problematic:

1. Worship God!
2. Since we are born into a life that is social, a shared life, harm no one but help everyone in kindness.
3. If it is impossible that absolutely no one be harmed, see to it that the number harmed be reduced to a minimum. Let those who disturb the public peace be removed. For this purpose let magistracies and punishments for the guilt be set up.
4. Property shall be divided for the sake of public peace. For the rest, some shall alleviate the wants of others through contracts. (Pauck, Melanchthon and Bucer, p. 52)

↩

57Calvin said that God “has put the sword into the hands of magistrates to suppress crimes against the first as well as against the second table of the Commandments of God.” Confessio Fidei Gallicana, chapter XXXIX as written in Philip Schaff, Creeds of Christendom, vol. III (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), p. 382.

He includes capital punishment of adultery in “the universal law of the Gentiles.” cf. Commentary on Deuteronomy 22:22. In his sermons on Deuteronomy Calvin says that “nature had taught them [the heathen]” concerning the justness of the death penalty for incorrigible children and “they possessed the instinct of nature, which they ought to have followed.” If death is not administered “there would be no order or reason in nature.” “if we do not receive this instruction, must it not follow that we are altogether destitute of sense?”

All the above from Sermons on Deuteronomy in “Calvin Speaks,” vol. 1/1 (August, 1980). Many more such examples of specific moral laws and the specific sanctions appended can be found in Calvin as Natural Law.↩

58Pauck, Melanchthon and Bucer, p. 52.↩

59Hugo Grotius, De Jure Belli ac Pacis, I.i.x as quoted in Robbins, “Some Problems With Natural Law,” p. 17.↩

60C. Gregg Singer, From Rationalism to Irrationality (Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1979), 54.↩

61Ibid, pp. 70-71.↩

62Ibid, pp. 346f.↩

63Ibid, p. 71.↩

64in Verna M. Hall, The Christian History of the Constitution of the United States of America (San Francisco: Foundation For American Christian Education, 1975), pp. 57-125.↩

65Alan F. Johnson, Is There a Biblical Warrant For Natural-Law Theories? JETS, 25/2 (June, 1982):197.↩

66Ibid, p 194.↩

67J. Barton, “Natural Law and Poetic Justice in the Old Testament,” JTS New Series 30/1 (1979):5.↩

68Ibid, pp. 12-13.↩

69An acquaintance of mine who is a professor at a Reformed seminary seems to have no problem with overturning O.T. penology in favor of penology derived from Natural Law, though he is much more biblical than some in agreeing that the State is subject to the Decalogue.↩

70P. B. Henry, Types of Protestant Theology and the Natural Law (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1970), p. 22 says, “Natural Law is conceived of as principles of human conduct that are discoverable by “reason” from the basic inclinations of human nature, and that are absolute, immutable and of universal validity for all times and places.” as quoted in Johnson, “Is There a Biblical Warrant For Natural-Law Theories?” p. 198.↩

71John Macquarrie, “Rethinking Natural Law,” in Three Issues in Ethics (New York: Harper, 1970), p. 108 says, “Natural Law changes, in the sense that the precepts we may derive from it change as human nature itself changes, and also in the sense that man’s self-understanding changes as he sharpens his image of mature manhood. But through the changes there remains the constancy of direction.” as quoted in Johnson, “Is There a Biblical Warrant For Natural-Law Theories?” p. 199.↩

72William K. Fankena, “Is Morality Logically Dependent on Religion?” in Gene Outka and John P. Reeder, Jr., Religion and Morality (Garden City: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1973). His conclusions can be summarized in the following selection:

And, indeed, if morality (and hence politics) is dependent on religion, then we must look to religion as a basis for any answer to any personal or social problem of any importance; but, if not, we may answer at least some of these problems on an “independent bottom,” as people used to say; for example, on the basis of history, science, and practical experience. If morality is dependent on religion, then we cannot hope to solve our problems, or resolve our differences of opinion about them, unless and in so far as we can achieve agreement and certainty in religion (not a lively hope). (p. 295)

↩

73See Robert N. Wilkin, “Natural Law in American Jurisprudence,” Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1948 (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1949), pp. 125-149.↩

74Interestingly, Wilkin, “Natural Law in American Jurisprudence,” p. 132 argues that national sovereignty is immoral in terms of Natural Law. He argues that the only hope for justice and liberty is in terms of a one world government. Many conservatives would intuitively see this as a call for tyranny on a grander scale than has ever been known!↩

75“Natural Law,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 451.↩

76See “Natural Law,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy for a convenient breakdown of these various views of nature.↩

77We will see later how this verse is very instructive for a proper view of Natural Law.↩

78“Natural Law,” Encyclopedia of Philosophy, p. 451.↩

79Donatien Alphonse Francois, Comte de Sade, La Philosophie dans le Boudoir, reprinted in French Utopias, Manuel and Manuel, editors, pp. 219, 222 as quoted in John Robbins, “Some Problems With Natural Law, Journal of Christian Reconstruction, II/2 (Winter, 1975-76):17.↩

80Robbins, “Some Problems With Natural Law,” p. 17.↩

81De Sade, French Utopias, p. 236 as quoted in Robbins, “Some Problems With Natural Law,” p. 17.↩

82Calvin’s sermon on Deuteronomy 21:18-21 in “Calvin Speaks” 1/2 (August, 1980).↩

83David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk. III, pt. 1, sec. 1.↩

84For instance, murder and incest are held up as being universally accepted taboos in every culture. However, there are many cultures that not only allow murder but promote it. For many years, the Arrusi tribe in Ethiopia required a male to kill another male before he could be counted as a man. In the early years of my parents’ ministry it was extremely dangerous to travel through that area. Don Richardson relates in his book Peace Child how treachery and murder were admired to such an extent that when he told the story of Judas betraying Christ they thought that Judas was an exceptional hero. It is simply not true that all cultures outlaw murder and incest, and even if they did, there is no consensus on what constitutes murder or incest. I am not arguing that they do not know that they are doing evil when they murder and commit incest, but I am saying that they suppress this knowledge so successfully that someone would be hard pressed to demonstrate to them that those things were wrong apart from a softening work of the Holy Spirit, and one would be hard pressed to find a universal moral ethic by means of anthropological studies (unless a mere majority would count!).↩

85See for instance the pathetically small (and abstract!) handful of principles that Theodore M. Hesburgh was able to cull from the essays of Natural Law theorists from the Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist and Chinese traditions - and these having in common at least that they believed in a God(s)! “Epilogue,” Natural Law Institute Proceedings, 1951, pp. 162-179.↩

86Gary North, Unconditional Surrender (Tyler: Geneva Divinity School Press, 1983), p. 38.↩

87The New Testament word for “presuppositions” is στοιχεῖα. This word was used in classical Greek and by the Church fathers to mean the elementary or fundamental principles. In Geometry it was used for axioms, and in philosophy for elements of proof or the πρωτοι συλλογισμοῖ of general reasoning (Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, s.v.). Obviously both of these definitions are synonyms with “presuppositions.” The New Testament teaches that the στοιχεῖα are the “foundation” upon which our faith and practice rests (Heb. 5:12-6:3). We find our στοιχεῖα in the Word of God (Heb. 5:12) and most specifically in the person of Jesus Christ (Col. 2:8-10; Heb. 6:1) revealed in them. The στοιχεῖα of the world are the foundation of the non-Christian “philosophy” (Col. 2:8) and are diametrically opposed to the στοιχεῖα of Christ the God-Man (Col 2:8-10). Our thoughts and actions are a logical outworking of these στοιχεῖα in everyday life (Col. 2:20ff). We must recognize that the superstructure of our world-and-life view is antithetical to the superstructure of the heathen’s world-and-life view, not because the superstructures do not have any things in common, but because of the way in which these superstructures are completely committed to their foundation or presuppositions. Paul gives us an example of this concept when he vigorously opposed the Galatians’ succumbing to pressure to be circumcised and observe “days and months and times and years” (Gal. 4:10). Though the physical act of circumcision was not wrong (cf. 1 Cor. 7:19; Acts 16:3), the idea that lay behind it was destructive and led to syncretism, a denial of their presuppositions, and an unintentional reversion to weak and pathetic presuppositions (Gal. 4:9).↩

88Cornelius Van Til, Christian Theistic Evidence (unpublished classroom syllabus), p. iii as quoted by Robert L. Reymond, A Christian View of Modern Science (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1964), p. 16.↩

89See Gordon H. Clark, The Philosophy of Science and Belief in God (Nutley: Craig Press, 1977) for an excellent expose of the pretensions of empiricism.↩

90See discussion above under The Pagan Tradition, Reasoning Powers Intact.↩

91Except in the way suggested in the last section of this book.↩

92Connaught Marshner, “Right and Wrong and America’s Survival,” in Future 21: Directions for America in the 21st-Century, p. 129 as quoted by Gary DeMar, “Building a Christian Civilization: Part V,” The Biblical Worldview, 2/5 (July, 1986), p.3.↩

93Alan, F. Johnson, “Is There a Biblical Warrant For Natural-Law Theories?” p. 197.↩

94Johnson, “Is There Biblical Warrant For Natural-Law Theories?” p. 192.↩

95Rabbi Solomon Freehof, “The Natural Law in the Jewish Tradition,” pp. 15-28.↩

96Unfortunately, many have a fear of religious persecution if Christians get in power (as if Christians are more to be feared than humanists!). Many examples could be multiplied of unscholarly diatribes such as those offered by Aiken Tailor in the Presbyterian Journal, but it is disconcerting when men like Laird Harris offer the same type of criticism. R. Laird Harris, “Theonomy in Christian Ethics: A Review of Greg L. Bahnsen’s Book,” Presbyterion, 5/1 (Spring, 1979), p. 14.↩

97herem: (n) accursed, under a ban. synonym: anathema.↩

98Archie P. Jones, “Natural Law and Christian Resistance to Tyranny,” in Christianity and Civilization, vol. 2 (Tyler: Geneva Divinity School Press, 1983), pp. 111,112.↩

99Jones, “Natural Law and Christian Resistance to Tyranny,” p. 121.↩

100Khalifa Abdul Hakim, “The Natural Law in the Moslem Tradition,” p. 63.↩

101Ibid, p. 47.↩

102Ibid , p. 44.↩

103Rushdoony, Institutes, p. 685.↩

104Westminster Confession of Faith, I.i.↩

105Nor was this just true of the American Puritans (as James Dennison, Jr. has tried to maintain). While the American Puritans had the opportunity to implement law and thus were more preoccupied with it, the English Puritans held to the same views. (This makes sense since the American Puritans were once English!) One example is Samuel Bolton, a commissioner to the Westminster Assembly, who said that his view was the majority view, though he recognized some who held that the Mosaic civil laws no longer applied. The following quotation should make Bolton’s position clear.

But it may be objected: Is it lawful for a magistrate to impose actions upon men which concern their consciences? I answer: It is not lawful for a magistrate to impose anything upon a Christian which it would not be lawful in the eyes of God for him to obey; that is, to set up an authority against Christ’s authority, the power of man against the power of God. But a magistrate may require those things at our hands which are clearly revealed to be the will of God. In this case we may say as the Samaritans said: “Now we believe, not because of thy sayings, but because we have heard him ourselves.”

…If we look into the Old Testament we find that it plainly sets forth the subordinate character of obedience in things spiritual. The people were bound to obey the magistrates when they commanded obedience to that which God had commanded, and to obey them, not as they were types of Christ, but as they were temporal magistrates and were set to defend the worship of God. Some have imagined that the power of magistrates, leading up to Christ, was to cease when Christ came, who is the great King of His Church, and in whom alone all authority over His people was to be confined, but I do not conceive it so. I conceive that a magistrate, without any trespassing on the authority of Christ, or infringement of the liberty of conscience of the Christian, may require those things to be obeyed which are clearly revealed to be the will and mind of Christ. Yet in this he is but a subordinate, and Christ is the supreme Master. The magistrate tells us what is God’s will, not what is his will. He tells us it is his will, too, but only because it is God’s will first. (Samuel Bolton, The True Bounds of Christian Freedom, (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1978), pp. 208, 209)

↩